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NOTES 175
Co.,2 1 it is said: "Permitting a defendant to allow judgment
against him for a maximum amount is usually not a consum-
mation devoutly to be wished for by him." That the Wisconsin
courts are careful to employ its practice in proper cases is in-
dicated by the language found in Rueter v. Hickman, Breuner
Co. 2 7 "But aside from that in a case like this where there is
legitimately such a wide range in the amount of damages that
may be properly assessed depending upon how the proof im-
presses the jury and the court, it is deemed a better administra-
tion of justice to let another jury assess the damages."
Thus to adopt a logical and theoretically justifiable practice is
to decrease its utility through a limitation of its operation and
application. The objection, however, which the Wisconsin doc-
trine seeks to avoid is perhaps not as serious as it appears. A
second jury is not likely in case of increscitur to award larger
damages than the court has fixed upon or in case of remittitur,
smaller damages.
If the court possesses the power to order a remittitur there is
no logical objection to its ordering an increscitur. It has been
advanced by those judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
who were out of sympathy with the exercise of the doctrine of
remittitur, that to allow a remission of part of the verdict would
also obligate the courts to allow an increscitur.28 There can be
little doubt that on principle the court occupies the same position
as to both. Increscitur like remittitur is applicable or should be
applicable to all cases where the award is not the result of pas-
sion or prejudice which contaminates the whole verdict and
permeates the question of liability as well as damages, and where
the evidence supports the finding of liability.
FRANK E. MATHEWS, '30.
CONSANGUINEOUS MARRIAGES-A SCIENTIFIC
APPROACH
Consanguineous marriages have been a problem for the human
race as far back as the memory of man goes. Whether such
unions should be favored, merely tolerated, prohibited, or ac-
tually made criminal is a question which has puzzled the law-
makers of every generation. Today despite the fact that both
legal science and eugenics have advanced considerably, there is
still grave question as to the advisability of first-cousin mar-
riages especially, and to a lesser degree uncle-niece (or aunt-
nephew) unions. This is shown in the present legal status of
N. 12 above.
N. 12 above.
See dissenting opinions in Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., n. 6 above.
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such unions. There are thirty jurisdictions in this country
which make first cousin marriages either absolutely void (which
is the usual case) or voidable, while there are twenty which
allow them., England now allows first cousin marriages. 2 Mar-
riages between uncle and niece (or aunt and nephew) are now
generally prohibited.3
In England in the early days, when marriage was governed
entirely by the ecclesiastical courts the degrees within which
persons related to each other could marry were regulated by
church law. This was based on chapter XVIII of Leviticus.
Gradually, however, the church began to extend the prohibition
beyond all reasonable bounds, so far that persons related to each
other in the seventh degree (by canon law; therefore-the four-
teenth by civil law) could not get married. The abuse became
so serious that it was not safe to get married. It was corrected,
however, by statute in the reign of Henry VIII, which statute
continued to remain the law (with minor changes) in England
to date. Under this law only persons related nearer than first
cousins (i. e., prohibition includes uncle-niece and aunt-nephew
marriages) are prohibited from marrying.4
Consanguineous marriages were by ecclesiastical law not void,
but merely voidable. In England, however, in 1835, a statute
made them void, and this is the tendency in the great majority
of American statesA Thus where a legislature declares a mar-
riage to be consanguineous, one so entered into is no marriage
at all, and may be dissolved at the will of either party or attacked
collaterally by third persons.
There have not been many American decisions on cousin-mar-
I States which prohibit first cousin marriages are: Arlzona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina (prohibits double first-cousins only),
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Jurisdictions where
such unions are allowed are: Alabama, California, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Federal. See also May, MARRIAGE
LAws AND DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1929) and very interesting
chart opposite p. 476.
Long, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1923), p. 27, sec. 22.
May, op. cit. opposite p. 476.
'For a more detailed account see Bishop, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
SEPARATION (1891) 108 ff. Also see, Long, op. cit. 26 IfT. Also Pollock &
Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1923) vol. 1, 366, 385-388.
'Long, op. cit. 27, sec. 22.
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riages, but a fairly exhaustive search fails to reveal any pro-
found public policy which the courts are trying to enforce. Most
of the cases are decided on purely statutory or technical
grounds.6 These cases usually come up when one party has died
and the other is trying to inherit, claiming that the marriage is
merely voidable, and cannot therefore be attacked after death.
The heirs claim it is void. And the courts, as noted above,
occupy their entire decisions in determining whether such mar-
riage is void, or merely voidable, rather than trying to fit the
statute to any policy.
Some, however, are not so reticent. One court reasons in this
manner: "The statute declaring marriages between uncles and
nieces to be void is a declaration of public policy of the State in
the interest of the welfare and morals of the State." Another
court highly indignant, perhaps because it could not apply the
statute retroactively to a marriage entered into prior to its en-
actment, says: "We cannot, however, refrain from stating that
such connections are destructive of good morals, and should not
only be frowned upon by the community, but be very severely
punished. '", But perhaps the crowning piece of judicial thought
is this omniscient declaration: "The statutes of this state on
marriage and divorce have mercifully provided that those who
unwittingly enter into marriage that leads to a continual viola-
tion of law, notwithstanding their original sin, may have such
relation annulled so that they may go and sin no more. Such
transgressors should get from before the public gaze as quickly
as possible." 9 These gems of legal thought typify the attitude
of the great majority of uninformed minds, both legal and
otherwise.
Of course in jurisdictions where such unions are permissible
the question of their validity does not arise. It is interesting to
note that the Uniform Marriage Law takes no stand on con-
sanguineous marriages, but leaves the matter entirely to the
states.'0 Apparently its authors did not consider themselves
'See for example: Bowers v. Bowers (S. C. 1858) 10 Rich. Eq. 551;
State v. Smith (1915) 101 S. C. 293, 85 S. E. 958; Sutton v. Warren (1845)
51 Mass. 451; Blaisdell v. Bickum (1885) 139 Mass. 250, 1 N. E. 281;
Walter's Appeal (1872) 70 Pa. 392; Arado v. Arado (1917) 281 III. 123,
117 N. E. 816, 4 A. L. R. 28; Weinberg v. Weinberg (1926) 242 Ill. App.
414; In re Estate of Wittick (1914) 164 Iowa 485, 145 N. W. 913; Baity v.
Crantlll (1884) 91 N. C. 293, 490 Am. Rep. 641; Succession of Bruissiere
(1889) 41 La. Ann. 217.
' Williams v. McKeene (1915) 193 Ill. App. 615.
'Jane Parker's Appeal (1863) 44 Pa. 309.
'Martin v. Martin (1903) 54 W. Va. 301, 46 S. E. 120.
1oSee 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 190, Uniform Marriage and Marriage
License Act. sec. 1.
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competent to decide, or, perhaps, felt it was a matter best left
to local prejudice.
The origin of all such laws is the so-called "horror of incest"
which is supposed to be "instinctive" in all of us. Recourse to
the works of anthropologists can only leave the student of law
in doubt as to whether such "horror or incest" is really instinc-
tive or not. One of them summarizes for us the various views."
Howard mentions Westermarck, one of the first students of the
institution of marriage and its history, as being the most promi-
nent believer in the "instinctive" idea. He believes that as the
"most fit" were products of exogamous rather than endogamous
marriages, and these were the ones who survived, the "horror
of incest" became instinctive, being transmitted from genera-
tion to generation. This theory is unfounded, say others, not-
ably Crawley, because it assumes that the most fit are always
products of exogamous (out-breeding) rather than endogamous
(inbreeding) families. He insists that incest was never "any-
thing but the rarest exception in any stage of human culture,
even the earliest, it being prevented by the psychological diffi-
culty with which love comes into play with persons either closely
associated or strictly separated before the age of puberty [both
systems are used by various primitive people], a difficulty en-
hanced by the ideas of sexual taboo, which are intensified in the
closeness of the family circle, where practical as well as religious
considerations cause parents to prevent any dangerous con-
nection." 12
Still another view is presented by Letourneau, quoted with
approval by Gillette: "It is quite certain that during the first
ages of the evolution of societies, the ties of kinship, even those
which we are accustomed to regard as sacred and respect for
which seems to be incarnate in us, have not been any impediment
to sexual unions. Like the sentiment of modesty, the horror of
incest has only been engraved on the human conscience with
great difficulty and by long culture.""3
It is apparent that the cause of 'these diverging views on the
origin of the horror of incest is that in primitive societies both
exogamy and endogamy existed, often side by side. Thus Craw-
ley shows us that a certain Fijian stock who by custom marry
first cousins are "considerably superiors in all the usual physi-
cal tests, of those stocks who forbid cousin marriage."' 14 Thus
G. E. Howard, A. HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) 130 ff.
Al. A. Crawley, THE MYSTIC ROSE, OR A STUDY OF PRIMITIVE MARRIAGE
(1902) 222 ff.
J. M. Gillette, THE FAMILY AND SOCIETY (1914) 48.
" Crawley, op. cit. 444.
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we cannot say for certain on the basis of anthropology what
causes the "horror of incest" in most of us. We must therefore
turn to another source to determine whether or not there is a
scientific basis for forbidding cousin-marriage.
Norman Haire emphatically concludes that "Geneticists have
proved that the harm to the race from any single case of in-
breeding is at least problematical, even if the union results in
offspring."-' This, in a general way, is the conclusion reached
through the study of eugenics. "Scientifically the results of
inbreeding are now well understood. They represent merely the
union of similar heredities; for instead of possessing wholly dif-
ferent inherited traits, the two mates are, by virtue of their
common ancestry, possessors to a greater degree than usual of
the same heritable characteristics."'16 Thus if the ancestry is
good, a double benefit results; if it is poor, a double detriment.
We may now proceed to examine the two familiar examples
of the Eighteenth dynasty and also that of the Ptolemies in
Egypt. Both of these were founded at a time when it took excel-
lent human material, both physically and mentally, to found a
dynasty. Both were continued, not by cousin-marriages, but
actually by brother and sister marriages. This practice existed
for several generations, and the offspring all proved capable
rulers. This close inbreeding in these two cases continued for
the longest known time in history, and none of the evils generally
attributed to cousin-marriages resulted.
The results here nearly equalled those obtained by breeders
of domestic animals, who long ago found that close inbreeding
brought out the best characteristics.17
Common superstition, apparently present in the minds of
many of our legislators, as well as the rest of the masses, seem-
ingly explained, naively enough, that when defective children
are born out of a marriage of kin, there was something inherently
wrong in the marriage of relatives, when in fact it was the an-
cestry that should be blamed. A proposed union should be ques-
tioned not on the basis of "are they related by blood" but rather
"are they carriers of desirable traits."
In 1908 Dr. George B. Louis Arner made a study of 723
cousin-marriages collected from various sources. His con-
clusions seem to be based on a very careful research which is
apparently unbiased.18 He found that consanguinity had little
Norman Haire, HYMEN OR THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE (1927).
"See interesting chapter in Popenpoe's MODERN MARRIAGE (1925) 60-70.
,Id.
See his article on Consanguineous Marriages, 31 COLUMBIA UNIvERsITY
STUDIFs IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBiUc LAW, No. 3 (1908) for a de-
tailed account of the study.
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or no direct effect upon the physical or mental condition of the
offspring. The most important effect of such a marriage is the
double inheritance. "It is probable that in the absence of de-
generative tendencies the higher qualities of mind and body are
intensified by marriage between highly endowed members of
the same family." Again, "the instinctive horror of incest is a
myth, for although a horror of incest does very properly exist
in civilized, and some tribal societies, it is purely a matter of
custom and education, and not at all a universal law." The
relative amount of degeneracy and disease among the offspring
of consanguineous marriages has been enormously exaggerated,
and the danger is by no means as great as is popularly sup-
posed.' 9
Thus, the science of eugenics has established the idea that
the consanguinity of the parents is not the cause of poor off-
spring; it is the defective heredity being doubled which brings
out recessive characteristics.
There are, however, reasons which tend to justify the con-
tinuance of the idea of the "horror of incest" among civilized
people. First, Arner's study indicated the fact that recessive
characteristics do crop out even in the most healthy individual
unions, in some cases after continued inbreeding.20 Further,
Popenpoe gives us a psychological reason for not encouraging
.this type of marriage. He says "too great an attachment be-
tween members of the same family, originating in youth, im-
poses a heavy handicap on the personality, ever vainly seeking
to free itself from the cramping influence of this emotional bond
in order to take its place in the outside world." It is better,
further, to have two families to advise and help, rather than
one.21 At best cousin-marriage usually connotes "a narrow hori-
zon and a lack of opportunity on the part of the mates to meet
a wider circle of eligible young people." 22
There remains then, having examined the data, to discover in
what way legal machinery should operate to control con-
sanguineous marriages.23 As has been seen, in many cases mar-
riages of the sort under discussion should actually be encouraged.
"Id. 90-93.
Id. 90, 91, 22.
P openpoe, op. cit. 67-70.
22 Id.
' It is well to note here that even where marriages of cousins are void by
statute the law is not enforced and cannot be. License clerks in many
states do not ask whether parties are related or not. No figures are avail-
able but violations by not mentioning the relationship, or by going to an-
other state, are undoubtedly frequent. One of its effects is to provide a
"painless method" of dissolving the marriage. See further Arner, op. cit.
14-15.
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The laws today which make such marriages void are foolish.
They render the relationship insecure, and are ineffective. They
have no real basis, for it has been proved that the bad heredity,
not the consanguinity of the parties, is the cause of ill effects
when they do follow. Perhaps in the future the law will not
forbid marriage on account of consanguinity. It will incorpo-
rate the principle that a marriage cannot be avoided on grounds
of consanguinity, but only because of proof of bad heredity (in
certain traits enumerated by the statute, such as deafness,
tuberculosis, etc.). And all marriages whether consanguineous
or not will be subject to such policy. It will insist that parties
to all marriages, not merely consanguineous, have a fairly good
ancestry. Or, in those cases where the heredity is poor, it will
provide for the sterilization of such unions. In short the laws
of marriage in the future will not be based on consanguinity,
but on the health and mentality of the parties entering them.
But without waiting for such a time, the laws making cousin-
marriages illegal, incestuous and void should be repealed. Such
marriages, at most, should be only voidable. In this way suc-
cessful unions could be allowed to exist legally, and not be in
danger of collateral attack after death. Unsuccessful marriages
could be voided at the suit of either party and possibly, of health
authorities of the state. The possibility that, due to double
heredity, there might be poor offspring could be provided for, as
indicated above, by special statute. Today we find the startling
situation of the majesty of the law forbidding marriage of two
healthy young people merely because, by accident of birth, they
are related, and allowing two congenitally deaf persons to marry
and produce progeny unfit to share the burdens of life!
RICHARD W. BROWN, '31.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS OF GUILT
The validity of statutory presumptions of guilt in criminal
prosecutions has long been a source of perplexing confusion and
a prolific basis of judicial conflict.' The root of attack lies in the
provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion and their corresponding embodiment in state constitutions
and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
One of the most important legal presumptions is that of inno-
'As early as 1793, this type of statute was passed. "In all prosecutions
and suits, whether criminal or civil, against persons for cutting out, alter-
ing or destroying the marks of the owner upon any logs or lumber, the
possession of the logs or lumber by the accused shall be presumptive evi-
dence of his guilt, and the burden of proof thrown on him to discharge
himself." Mass. Laws (1793) c. 42, sec. 6.
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